Working papers
- “Screening, Liability, and Recidivism: A Model of Certificates of Rehabilitation”
- “Marriage Market Competition and Labor Supply” with Demid Getik
Under review
- “Statistical Discrimination and Labor Force Participation”
Published papers
- “Who is Protected by Employment Protection?” with Laura Montenovo, recently accepted at The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy
- “Heterogeneous Effects of At-Will Employment Exceptions”, recently accepted at ILR Review
- “Just Cause Protection Under Manager Discrimination” with Aaron Sojourner, ILR Review
- “Effects of Fair Workweek Laws on Labor Market Outcomes” with Aaron Sojourner, Industrial Relations
- “Deunionization and Skills”, Labour Economics
“Screening, Liability, and Recidivism: A Model of Certificates of Rehabilitation”
Abstract: Certificates of Rehabilitation (CORs) are a promising policy tool to help workers with a criminal record (WCs) gain access to employment and avoid recidivism. While several states have passed relevant legislation in recent years, take-up has been low, in large part because of a lack of awareness.
This paper develops a model of CORs to understand how their increased prevalence could affect outcomes for WCs. Workers differ in unobserved risk type and decide whether to apply for certification, and later, whether to reoffend. Firms cannot observe type and instead rely on certification status as a signal when making hiring decisions, accounting for both productivity and expected litigation risk. In equilibrium, under mild assumptions, low-risk workers are more likely to apply for and receive certification, generating positive selection into the certified pool, and firms statistically discriminate against the uncertified pool.
As awareness of CORs increases, under a single crossing assumption, more low-risk workers obtain certification, improving outcomes for certified individuals through higher employment and lower recidivism. However, this reallocation worsens the composition of the uncertified pool, making it disproportionately high-risk. Firms respond by reducing hiring of uncertified workers, which further increases their recidivism through both direct compositional changes and reduced employment.
Since CORs have had little take-up, one would expect state legislation to have a negligible effect on aggregate outcomes for WCs. Using four different methods on publicly available data, I find no consistent effects.
In sum, the theoretical results motivate a more thorough empirical analysis with better data. They also highlight an important tradeoff: expanding access to CORs benefits those who obtain certification but imposes negative spillovers on those who do not.
“Marriage Market Competition and Labor Supply”
Abstract: This paper examines how marriage market prospects influence decisions related to labor supply. Using U.S. microdata, we construct a novel and granular measure of marriage-market tightness. To address endogeneity from demographic mobility or labor-market shocks, we implement a Bartik-style instrument, approximating local population changes with national demographic shifts. We show that competition has sizable effects across gender and education groups. For single men, greater competition decreases non-participation and hours for those without a bachelor’s degree, and increases income and hours for those with a bachelor’s degree. For single women without a bachelor’s degree, greater competition increases non-participation.
“Statistical Discrimination and Labor Force Participation”
Abstract: This paper explores the role of productivity-based statistical discrimination (PBSD) in black-white employment-related outcome gaps using a structural model. Given a worker’s race and a noisy signal of their productivity, employers rely on race-specific averages to inform their expectations. Such discrimination results in worse employment prospects for black workers. I discipline the model using 1997 NLSY data on less-educated young prime-aged white and black males and a novel calibration strategy. My results suggest PBSD plays at most a limited role in non-participation, unemployment, and hiring gaps, while productivity differences are likely much more important.
“Who is Protected by Employment Protection?”
Abstract: This paper examines how loosening employment protection legislation (EPL) affects workers with different characteristics. Exploiting a 2012 Italian law, the “Fornero Reform,” and using a difference-in-differences strategy on administrative data, we causally estimate heterogeneous effects on termination rates by sex-age, job rank, income, industry, and tenure. We find a relative increase in terminations for high-tenure, white-collar, and manufacturing workers. Though not direct evidence, this suggests that the stricter EPL was providing more protection to these worker groups on average. Further, the high-tenure increase may indicate that poor performers were protected for many years pre-reform. Our findings add to the EPL heterogeneous effect literature and limited work on the interaction between EPL and tenure.
“Heterogeneous Effects of At-Will Employment Exceptions”
Abstract: In the 1970s and 1980s, almost all state courts in the U.S. created common-law exceptions to at-will employment. Motivated by gaps in previous work, this paper investigates the labor market effects of at-will employment exceptions (AWEE) by race, sex, age, and education. To compute treatment effects, I exploit differences in establishment timing across states using an individual-level difference-in-differences design on Current Population Survey data. The unifying narrative from the main analysis is that AWEE disproportionately harmed Hispanic employment. This may have occurred because Hispanics are relatively likely to be employed informally and relatively likely to be undocumented immigrants. A supplementary analysis largely supports this possibility, but is inconclusive due to data limitations. This narrative is unique in the relevant literature.
“Just Cause Protection Under Manager Discrimination”
Abstract: Just cause policies aim to discourage the arbitrary firing of employees. Recent efforts at passing such laws in the U.S. have been motivated by deterring discrimination. This paper presents a framework to study the effects of just cause when managers engage in taste-based discrimination. Under biased managers, one would expect to see separations of disfavored workers concentrated in the initial probationary period, before workers are covered by the just cause protection. Since probationary periods are a typical feature of protections, the approach is generalizable. We test this prediction using New York City’s 2021 just cause law for fast-food employees, and a synthetic difference-in-differences design on publicly-available data. We do not find results consistent with taste-based discrimination against black, Hispanic, female, nor older workers, though lack of enforcement or data issues could drive the nulls. Further analysis suggests another mechanism: screening discrimination against younger workers.
“Effects of Fair Workweek Laws on Labor Market Outcomes”
Abstract: This paper models fair workweek regulations that require employers to provide employees with (1) schedule predictability via advance notice of their work schedule and premium payments for short-notice changes, and (2) access to hours meaning they must offer open hours to existing employees before hiring new workers. We develop a theoretical model of employers’ responses to these provisions and their implications for employment. Guided by the model, we estimate the effects of recently-adopted fair workweek regulation in New York City’s fast-food sector using a synthetic difference-in-differences design. We find a null employment effect.
“Deunionization and Skills”
Abstract: A search and matching model is developed to investigate the effect of skill distribution change and skill-biased technical change (SBTC) on United States private sector unionization. The model’s equilibrium is such that workers with moderate skill will select into the union sector while those with low or high skill will select into the non-union sector. The model’s calibration to the U.S. private sector employs a novel method to separate movements in the skill distribution and skill premium. This, in turn, is used to help identify SBTC. A counterfactual analysis documents a significant relationship between the skill distribution and unionization. In particular, a rise in skill dispersion accounts for one-seventh of U.S. private sector deunionization between 1984 and 2019. This analysis also gives a quantitative effect of SBTC in line with the literature: it accounts for between one-fifth and two-fifths of deunionization depending on the specification. However, part of its qualitative effect is novel: SBTC shifts unionization towards more skilled workers. Further analysis suggests that skill distribution change is not likely to have a significant effect on private sector unionization in the future.
